Security Improvements

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🎯 Executive Summary

• ✅ 7 Critical & high-priority vulnerabilities eliminated
• ✅ Enterprise audit logging system implemented
• ✅ Automated CI/CD security pipeline established
• ✅ 3 new comprehensive security test suites added
• ✅ Complete security documentation created

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🔒 Critical Security Vulnerabilities Fixed

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1. Debug Endpoint with Service Role Key Exposure (CRITICAL)

• Exposed SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY in debug endpoint
• Could be accessed in development mode
• Leaked user profile database queries
• Showed session tokens in detail

• Complete removal of debug endpoint
• No replacement needed - use production logging instead

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2. Supabase Client Proliferation (HIGH)

• Created new Supabase clients instead of using centralized supabaseAdmin
• Multiple service role keys scattered across codebase
• Harder to audit and rotate keys

• Replaced all createClient() calls with centralized supabaseAdmin
• Enforces single point of configuration

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3. XSS via Integration ID Injection (HIGH)

• Intercom/Fathom integration IDs inserted directly into JavaScript without validation
• Admin could inject malicious code via integration settings

• Created /lib/security/integration-validator.ts
• Validates integration IDs against strict patterns:
  • Intercom: ^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{3,50}$
  • Fathom: ^[A-Z0-9]{6,20}$
• Added escapeForJavaScript() for defense-in-depth
• Server-side validation before rendering

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4. Weak Crypto Secret Configuration (HIGH)

• WORKOS_COOKIE_PASSWORD allowed placeholder default
• Could start application with insecure session encryption

• Added validation at startup - application fails without proper secret
• No default value allowed (fail-secure)

if (!process.env.WORKOS_COOKIE_PASSWORD) {
  throw new Error(
    "[SECURITY] WORKOS_COOKIE_PASSWORD environment variable is required...",
  );
}

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5. Unauthorized Financial Data Access (CRITICAL)

• No submission ownership verification in Plaid operations
• User A could access User B’s bank account numbers/routing numbers
• User A could store Plaid tokens in User B’s submission

• Created /lib/security/submission-guard.ts
• Added verifySubmissionAccess() to all Plaid functions:
  • exchangePlaidBankToken() - Verify before token exchange
  • storePlaidAccessToken() - Verify before storing
  • getPlaidBankAccountDetails() - Verify before retrieving sensitive data
• Supports both authenticated and anonymous forms

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6. User Impersonation via Import Functions (HIGH)

• Functions accepted optional userId parameter
• User A authenticated could pass userId of User B
• Import jobs created as different user

• Removed optional userId parameter
• Always use authenticated user from session
• No override possible

export async function startImageImportJob(
  images: ImageImportInput[],
  aiModel: AIModel,
  userId?: string, // ❌ REMOVED
);

export async function startImageImportJob(
  images: ImageImportInput[],
  aiModel: AIModel, // ✅ No userId parameter
) {
  const session = await getSession();
  const finalUserId = session.user.id; // Always use session
}

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7. Unauthorized File Operations (HIGH)

• deleteFormFile() and getSecureFileUrl() had no auth checks
• User could delete/access files from any form if they knew the path
• Path validation alone insufficient

• Added checkFormAccess() to both functions
• Extract formId from path and verify user has access
• Path format validated: formId/fileId/fileName

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🏗️ New Security Infrastructure

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1. Submission Ownership Guard

• verifySubmissionAccess(submissionId) - Main guard function
• Supports authenticated and anonymous forms
• Returns form context for additional checks
• Audit logging of access attempts

const authResult = await verifySubmissionAccess(submissionId);
if (!authResult.success) {
  return { success: false, error: authResult.error };
}

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2. Integration Validator

• Pattern validation for Intercom and Fathom IDs
• JavaScript escaping for defense-in-depth
• Audit logging of validation failures
• Reusable for future integrations

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3. Enterprise Audit Logger

• Matches existing database schema (migration 027)
• Non-blocking (failures don’t interrupt user operations)
• Helper functions for common scenarios:
  • logFormAudit() - Form mutations
  • logSubmissionAudit() - Submission operations
  • logAuthAudit() - Authentication events
  • logBulkOperationAudit() - Bulk operations
  • logSecurityAudit() - Security events
  • logSettingsAudit() - Settings changes

• Who: user_id, user_email, user_role
• What: action_type (create, update, delete, etc.)
• Which: entity_type, entity_id
• When: created_at (UTC timestamp)
• Where: ip_address, user_agent
• Context: metadata, changes (before/after diff)

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📊 CI/CD Security Pipeline

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GitHub Actions Workflow

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1. Typecheck + Build Verification

• Build succeeds in CI before merge
• Prevents type regressions and broken production builds

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2. Lint + Unit/Integration Tests

• ESLint runs on all changes
• Vitest suite runs in CI (includes auth/security route tests)

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3. E2E Guardrail Enforcement

• CI blocks test.skip/describe.skip/it.skip in Terra Playwright specs
• Chromium smoke gate validates public /status route

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4. Release Automation

• Tag-based release workflow generates GitHub releases from shipped commits
• Manual dispatch supports patch releases and prerelease flow

• Pull requests to main
• Pushes to main

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🧪 Security Test Coverage

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Test Suite 1: Plaid Security

• ✅ Owner can exchange token for their submission
• ✅ User blocked from accessing another user’s submission
• ✅ Unauthenticated users blocked
• ✅ Non-existent submission blocked
• ✅ Anonymous forms allowed without ownership check
• ✅ Owner can store token for their submission
• ✅ Owner can retrieve bank details for their submission
• ✅ User blocked from retrieving another user’s bank details
• ✅ Input validation (missing parameters)

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Test Suite 2: File Security

• ✅ Admin can delete files from their own form
• ✅ User blocked from deleting files from other forms
• ✅ Unauthenticated users blocked
• ✅ Path traversal attempts blocked (../../../etc/passwd)
• ✅ Backslash paths blocked (Windows-style traversal)
• ✅ Absolute paths blocked (/etc/passwd)
• ✅ FormId extraction from path works correctly
• ✅ Team member can get file URL from their form
• ✅ User blocked from accessing other forms’ files
• ✅ Path traversal blocked in getSecureFileUrl
• ✅ Missing formId in path handled
• ✅ Empty path handled
• ✅ Null byte injection blocked
• ✅ Super admin can access any form’s files

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Test Suite 3: Import Security

• ✅ Uses authenticated user’s ID for image import
• ✅ Rejects import when not authenticated
• ✅ Ignores userId parameter if somehow passed (defense-in-depth)
• ✅ Uses authenticated user’s ID for PDF import
• ✅ Rejects PDF import when not authenticated
• ✅ Creates separate jobs for different users
• ✅ Validates image array is not empty
• ✅ Validates image count limit (max 8)
• ✅ Validates PDF file type (.pdf only)
• ✅ Validates PDF file size (10MB limit)

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📚 Documentation Created

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1. SECURITY.md (Comprehensive Security Policy)

• Security Architecture (5-layer defense-in-depth)
• Threat Model (assets, actors, attack vectors)
• Authentication & Authorization (RBAC, RLS)
• Data Protection (encryption, PII handling)
• Audit & Compliance (SOC 2, ISO 27001, GDPR)
• Vulnerability Reporting (responsible disclosure)
• Security Best Practices (developer guide)

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2. Security Improvements Summary

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📈 Metrics & Statistics

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Security Posture

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Code Quality

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🎯 Compliance Status

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SOC 2 Type II

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ISO 27001

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GDPR

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🔄 Next Steps (Remaining Work)

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High Priority

• Add rate limiting to public endpoints
• Strengthen CSP headers (remove unsafe-inline for styles)
• Add HSTS and additional security headers
• Implement session timeout policies

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Medium Priority

• Create COMPLIANCE.md for certification process
• Document data retention and backup policies
• Enable and fix locale field tests
• Add webhook and notification integration tests

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Low Priority

• Reduce type assertions in form-import modules
• Complete email notification template TODO
• Refactor large components (properties-panel.tsx)

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🚀 Deployment Checklist

• WORKOS_COOKIE_PASSWORD environment variable is set (32+ chars)
• All Supabase environment variables configured
• Audit logging table created (migration 027)
• CI/CD pipeline enabled and passing
• Security headers configured in middleware
• Rate limiting configured (when implemented)
• Monitoring and alerting active (Sentry)
• Backup and disaster recovery tested

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📞 Security Contacts